Our Gemara discusses how many judges are required to preside over the case of an animal that gores, determining that it requires 23 judges, similar to a human capital case. The Gemara then poses a hypothetical question: What would be the status of an animal that ascended Mount Sinai during the time it was forbidden?

The relevant verses describe the temporary sanctity conferred upon Mount Sinai prior to the revelation and the giving of the Torah (Shemos 19:12-13):

"You shall set bounds for the people round about, saying, ‘Beware of going up the mountain or touching the border of it. Whoever touches the mountain shall be put to death.
Do not touch it—by being either stoned or thrown; beast or person, a trespasser shall not live.’ When the ram’s horn sounds a long blast, they may go up on the mountain.”

Since such an animal would also be sentenced to death, the Gemara wonders whether its case would likewise require a court of 23 judges.

Tosafos is perplexed by this question, as it appears to have no halachic relevance. Unlike laws such as those of sacrifices, which might become relevant in the future, the sanctity of Mount Sinai was explicitly temporary. The verse even takes pains to desacralize Mount Sinai, emphasizing that it is not to remain a holy site: “When the ram’s horn sounds a long blast, they may go up on the mountain.” This likely underscores a central tenet of our faith: there was only one revelation, and there will be no “New Testaments.”

Returning to the discussion, Tosafos questions why it matters to discuss a halacha that will never occur again. Tosafos ultimately suggests that the purpose may be to enhance our understanding of the verses.

What shifted in Tosafos’ reasoning from his question to his answer? Initially, Tosafos seems to consider something to be Torah only if it has a practical halachic outcome, whether in the present or future, but not the past. From this strict logical perspective, Tosafos struggles to see the value of studying a case with no practical implications. Yet Tosafos concludes that understanding each verse in the Torah is itself a mitzvah, and thus the practical outcome of this study is the comprehension of the verse.

However, Tosafos’ answer appears tautological: If the purpose of studying Torah is to derive practical outcomes, how can the practical outcome be merely understanding the Torah itself? Furthermore, Tosafos seems to reinvent the wheel by positing that understanding the verse is intrinsically valuable, despite numerous Gemaras stating this very idea explicitly. For example, the Gemara (Sanhedrin 51b, 71a; Zevachim 45a) teaches that one should “expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning.” Indeed, the Ran on our Gemara addresses Tosafos’ question by invoking these sources. Why, then, does Tosafos neither quote these Gemaras nor adopt their language?

I believe Tosafos perceives a nuanced distinction. Those other Gemaras involve discussing laws derived from Torah texts, even if the actual cases may never occur—such as the laws of a leprous house, a condemned idolatrous city, or a rebellious son. These are deemed worthy of study because they are written in the Torah. Even if they never occurred and tradition asserts they never will, their inclusion in the Torah compels us to engage with them as if they might occur. In fact, one might argue that these laws have served as deterrents or provided moral insights that shaped society, preventing their occurrence.

In contrast, Tosafos struggles with our Gemara because it explores a hypothetical past event. No animal ever ascended Mount Sinai, and such a scenario will never happen again. Therefore, Tosafos concludes that the value of studying Torah extends beyond the practical halachic realm to the implications of its verses, even in hypothetical cases.

Why is this valuable? Because internalizing the ethos and morality of the Torah extends beyond the specifics of any individual law. For example, it is meaningful that an animal is treated with the same judicial rigor as a human in a capital case. It is also significant that an animal ascending Mount Sinai during a moment of spiritual intensity for the nation would still be accorded the highest level of due process, even in such a mundane context. These ethical principles, while speculative, illustrate the Torah’s broader moral messages. The particulars may vary, but the overarching idea, that Torah study fosters moral and spiritual growth by its principles, is undoubtedly valid.

Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation

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