Our Gemara on amud beis discusses the degree of liability when a person commits idolatry but is unaware that the Torah forbids it. The Gemara’s primary focus is on whether and what kind of sacrifice must be brought. However, we will set aside that aspect and explore a different dimension of this topic: How does the Torah relate to accidental heresy? What if a yerei shamayim—a God-fearing and sincere seeker of truth—misinterprets a Torah principle or an ethical concept and, as a result, holds beliefs or doubts that technically constitute heresy?

One of the most famous expressions of this conundrum is found in a dispute between the Rambam and the Ra’avad. In Hilchos Teshuvah (3:7), the Rambam lists various beliefs that define a min (heretic), including:

“One who maintains that God has a body or form.”

The Ra’avad takes strong exception to this statement, writing:

“Why does he call such a person a min? Many greater and better than he followed this opinion based on what they saw in Scripture, and more particularly in the texts of the Midrashim, which misdirected their thinking.”

The Ra’avad fully agrees that the correct belief is that God has neither body nor form. Yet, he cannot accept the Rambam’s classification of such innocent, pious individuals as heretics. His main objection appears to be that since they were following what they understood from Scripture and Midrashim, they cannot be blamed for their mistake.

At the core of this dispute lies a fundamental question: While heresy is a sin, is it only a sin, or is it something more? If a person holds a profoundly distorted belief, even with the purest intentions, can their soul still achieve aliyah (elevation)? One might argue that God, in His infinite wisdom, "grades on a curve" and considers mitigating factors.

For instance, let’s say someone fully believes in God but misunderstands that one must pray only to Him. Instead, he mistakenly believes it is permissible to pray to intermediaries, such as the sun or the moon. (The Rambam describes this very mistake as the error of the generation of Enosh in Hilchos Avodah Zarah 1:1.) Perhaps one could argue that since this person ultimately believes in God, his error is forgivable.

But what if a person’s honest intellectual inquiry leads him to atheism? He is not rebelling against God—he simply does not recognize Him. In such a case, should we still view him as a sinner, or is he simply lost?

Yet, how can someone be granted reward if they do not meet even the most minimal requirements of belief? Perhaps we can acknowledge their moral behavior for what it is, but if Olam Haba is predicated on a relationship with God, how can a person who does not believe in Him maintain such a connection?

The Rambam, in his Peirush HaMishnayos (Perek Chelek), takes this even further. He does not merely assert that reward in the next world comes from attachment to God—he defines attachment to God as the reward itself. The soul’s eternal existence depends on its connection to God’s truth and intellect. If so, how could an innocent, well-meaning atheist—no matter how ethical—experience Olam Haba if he lacks any conscious bond with the Divine?

On the other hand, one could argue that moral behavior, even without explicit belief, still fosters a degree of attachment to God. By emulating His ways, even unknowingly, a person may generate the necessary spiritual sustenance for his soul to endure.

According to the Rambam, however, innocence is not enough. If a person constructs a fundamentally flawed concept of God, he cannot achieve the necessary deveikus (spiritual conjoinment) to sustain his soul’s immortality. Believing that God has a body is not a trivial mistake—it carries profound theological implications. A physical being must have been created. A physical being has boundaries and is therefore finite. A finite being is subject to change and entropy. Such a being cannot be omnipotent or eternal. In this view, the mistaken believer is knocking on the wrong door, unable to attain the connection he needs.

The Ra’avad, by contrast, seems to adopt a less abstract view of reward and punishment. His concept aligns more closely with the classic hashkafah that we are often taught: God, in His Beis Din shel Ma’alah, judges and dispenses reward and punishment according to a person’s sincerity and deeds. For the Ra’avad, a moral person—sincere in his beliefs, even if mistaken—receives reward commensurate with his righteousness.

That said, the Ra’avad likely has his own boundaries. He may be willing to tolerate technical heresies as long as the person’s fundamental belief in God remains intact. But what about a sincere atheist who, despite living a moral life, does not believe in God at all? Would the Ra’avad still consider him worthy of Olam Haba? That remains an open question.

For further discussion on accidental heresy, see Sefer HaIkkarim (Ma’amar 1:1 and 1:2), where he echoes the Ra’avad’s position that certain mistaken beliefs—when rooted in honest error—are forgivable. As a counterpoint, see the Abarbanel in Rosh Amanah 12, where he argues that if a belief undermines fundamental theological doctrines, the person remains fully accountable and is classified as a true heretic.

Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation

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Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, LCSW-R, DHL is a psychotherapist who works with high conflict couples and families as well male sexual health. He can be reached via email at simchafeuerman@gmail.com